Recent U.S. policy encourages anchor investments to facilitate initial public offerings (IPO) and increase companies' access to external finance. As access to external funds relies on stocks remaining listed, we study anchor investors' impact on how long IPOs stay listed. We examine two types of anchor investors in Hong Kong: strategic and cornerstone investors, that are similar to U.S. anchor investors, but make varying levels of commitment at and post-IPO.
Introduction
The recent U.S. policy initiatives contained in the so-called Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act allow companies planning a share listing to test the waters by gathering anchor investors' expressions of interest in the company shares before filing for an IPO with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The main policy objectives of the JOBS Act are ensuring firms' access to external finance with a view to encouraging real investment and job creation/preservation. Whether these policy objectives of the JOBS Act are likely to be achieved following a company's IPO relies on whether and how long the company shares remain listed on a stock market. The longer a company's stock remains listed on a stock market, the longer will the company have access to external capital. Anchor investors are commonly seen as facilitating the marketing of IPOs. We argue that they may also play a role in the post-IPO survival of share listings and examine the impact of anchor investors on the length of time stocks remain listed after an initial public offering (IPO). A recent study by Dambra, Field and Gustafson (2015) report that the introduction of the JOBS Act has had a positive impact on IPO volume. Our study adds to their findings on new listings by shedding light on the impact of anchor investors on how long such new listings remain listed.
Our study contributes to the current debate over the role of anchor investors. Although stock markets in the U.S. and elsewhere are increasingly encouraging the involvement of anchor investors prior to IPOs, little is known about the impact of anchor investors on IPO performance. In fact, the involvement of anchor investors has resulted in controversy in some IPOs, most notably the Royal Mail IPO in the UK. The flipping of shares by Royal Mail's cornerstone investors led to a policy review (Myners 2014 ) that highlighted the need for research on the issue.
We consider two types of committed anchor investors: strategic investors and cornerstone investors. These investors have played a prominent role in the Hong Kong IPO market since they first appeared in the wake of the East Asian Crisis of 1997. Strategic investors are typically dedicated long-term investors who derive additional cash flows from their investment in the firm, or who add value to the issuing firm, e.g., through their reputation and capabilities (Fuerst and Geiger 2003) . In many cases, they are corporate investors that operate in the same industrial sector as the issuing company. For example, the IPO of Chalco, the Similar to U.S. anchor investors, these investors agree to invest in the IPO at the book building stage; but unlike in the U.S, these anchors investors enter into commitments both at the investment and post-IPO. Specifically, cornerstone and strategic investors enter into binding placing agreements with the issuing company and its advisors just prior to the release of the IPO prospectus whereby they agree to invest a specified monetary amount in the IPO.
In return for this agreement, strategic and cornerstone investors are guaranteed to receive IPO shares for the full amount they pre-commit (even if the issue ends up being oversubscribed).
Hong Kong listing rules require IPO firms and their underwriters to disclose full details relating to the allocation of shares to cornerstone and strategic investors. The guaranteed allocation of shares to these investors is also tied to post-IPO commitments as all cornerstone and strategic investors enter into lock-up agreements with IPO underwriters not to sell the shares they are allocated at the IPO during an agreed post-IPO lock-up period.
In the U.S., by contrast, anchor investors express their interests in investing in the IPO shares but these expressions of interest are not legally binding. There is no requirement on companies in the U.S. to disclose either the names or investments of anchor investors at the time of the IPO. And U.S. anchor investors do not enter to lockup agreements committing not to sell the shares they buy for a specified period after the IPO.
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Our analysis examines the impact of anchor-investor commitment on the length of time IPO stocks remain listed, and hence, the length of time the company continues to have access to external finance. Comparing the two types of committed anchor investors in Hong Kong, we find that strategic investors are significantly more committed than cornerstone investors both at the time of the IPO and particularly post-IPO. We find that longer post-IPO commitment, and greater involvement of strategic investors, including foreign investors, increases the length of time IPOs stock remain listed. Cornerstone investors, by contrast, appear to have little impact on IPO survival unless their post-IPO commitments are certified by a reputable underwriter.
Our results suggest that anchors investors play a role not just in helping companies achieve a listing but also in maintaining that listing post-IPO. However, the achievement of the latter, which is closely linked to the policy objective of the JOBS Act of ensuring company's access to finance over the longer-term, relies on the extent to which anchor investors are committed particularly post-IPO.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the impact of cornerstone and strategic investors on IPO survival performance. The absence of comparable research in most markets is due to the lack of data on anchor investor involvement in IPOs and on the allocation of shares in IPOs. The Hong Kong market is one of a handful of markets that require full disclosure of detailed information on overall investor demand for IPOs and the allocation of shares in the IPO to various investor groups, including retail, institutional, cornerstone and strategic investors.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on IPO survival (e.g., Hensler et al. 1997, Jain and Kini 2000) . The length of time a stock remains listed post-IPO matters to issuers. Issuers trade off the high costs of an IPO against the benefits of being listed. The benefits of a stock-market listing (including the ability to raise new funds in the primary market and trade existing shares in a liquid secondary market) are only available as long as an IPO remains listed on the stock market. The continued listing of an IPO is also of significance to outside investors who seek financial returns from liquid investments, and even to stock markets, whose reputations suffer when there are high numbers of delistings. Our paper is related to studies that examine the impact on IPO survival of pre-IPO investors (such as venture capital investors) and other 5 backers of the issuing firm providing pre-IPO certification (such as reputable underwriters or advisors). Our analysis shows that in addition to a direct effect of underwriter reputation on IPO survival, there is also an interaction effect suggesting that certification by reputable underwriters makes anchor-investor commitment more credible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the institutional background of the Hong Kong Stock Market, and Section 3 outlines the existing literature and our research objectives. Section 4 describes the data and methodology. Our empirical findings are discussed in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
Institutional Background
This section describes the key regulatory features of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange that are relevant to IPO share allocation and the role of cornerstone and strategic investors. The IPO market of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) ranks highly internationally. It has proved to be resilient in terms of IPO volume while other IPO markets (including NASDAQ and NYSE) experienced sharp declines after the internet bubble (1999) (2000) (2001) In terms of the allocation of shares to investors in an IPO, the HKEx combines clear rules with a significant degree of underwriter discretion. On the one hand, the allocation of shares to retail investors is subject to rules, including rules on the method of allocating shares to investors in oversubscribed IPOs.
1 On the other hand, shares in the placing tranche are allocated to institutional, high-net-worth and corporate investors (both foreign and local) at the underwriter's discretion. Up-front, guaranteed allocations to cornerstone and strategic investors constitute a significant part of the placing tranche (McGuinness 2014).
1 Underwriters are required to allocate to retail investors 30% of the issue if demand in the subscription tranche is between 15-50 times the initial allocation, 40% of the issue when such demand is between 50-100 times the initial allocation, and 50% of the issue when demand is (over) 100 times the initial allocation. This standardized clawback provision does not apply to the additional shares that may be issued under the overallotment option (OAO) where underwriters retain full discretion over share allocation.
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Unlike most markets, including the US and UK, the Hong Kong market requires full disclosure of information on the overall demand for IPO shares by investors, and on the allocation of shares in the IPO to various investor groups, including cornerstone and strategic investors as well as retail investors and institutions. Cornerstone and strategic investors enter into contractual placing agreements with the issuing company and its advisors, guaranteeing them a share allocation at the IPO amounting to a predefined dollar amount. This is done just prior to the release of the prospectus and before the number of shares set aside for subscription to retail and institutional investors is finalized. The listing rules require IPO firms and their underwriters to disclose the full details relating to the allocation of shares to these privileged (cornerstone and strategic) investors. The guaranteed allocation of shares is often tied to commitments (lock-up agreements) made by the investor 7 to the IPO underwriters not to sell the allocated shares during an agreed lock-up period. Our analysis below shows that strategic investors normally commit to lock-up periods of between 6 and 36 months, with an average of 12 months, while cornerstone investors are typically locked up for periods ranging from 6 to 12 months (with the average being 6 months). This is consistent with existing evidence on lockup periods reported in McGuinness (2012 McGuinness ( , 2014 
Literature and Research Questions
There is a substantial body of literature on the survival of newly listed stocks mostly focusing on North America. Their reported failure rates range widely due to differences between markets, sample periods, and stock characteristics (e.g., penny or high-tech stocks). E.g., U.S.
estimates of five-year survival rates range from 9 to 47 percent certify the quality of the issuing firm. Alternatively, or in addition, we expect a treatment (or value-added) effect due to the post-IPO monitoring and nurturing of the issuing company by its long-term investors that adds value, or rather "survivability", to the company post-IPO.
As cornerstone investors seek financial returns often in the short to medium term, we expect that they impact post-IPO performance through selection or certification. By contrast, strategic investors by definition aim to derive or add non-financial value from long-term investments in the issuing firm. Hence, we expect these investors to (mainly) impact post-IPO performance through nurturing such as post-IPO monitoring or sharing of expertise and networks. On the other hand, strategic investors may also have a selection effect: given their long-term strategic interests, they are likely to invest specifically in IPOs they expect to survive for longer.
We model several dimensions of the impact of cornerstone and strategic investors. The first avenue of influence is through the size of the share allocation to each of these investor types in the IPO. Larger allocations may suggest a greater commitment by investors before the IPO and a greater influence on the issuing company post-IPO. Pre-IPO commitment and post-IPO alignment of interests is also captured by the length of the investors' lock-up period. We expect strategic investors to have longer lock-up periods than the more short-term-oriented cornerstone investors. Also, we expect strategic investors' lock-up periods to have a stronger impact on post-IPO performance.
Data and Methodology
We (Hensler et al. 1997 , Jain and Kini 2000 , Espenlaub et al. 2012 ) use the AFT method that allows the impact of the independent variables on the survival time to vary over the post-IPO period, depending on the length of time since listing.
The AFT model is typically expressed in terms of a log-linear function with respect to time (see e.g. Hensler et al. 1997; Bradburn et al. 2003) :
Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
where Ln(Tj) is the natural logarithm of the survival time or time to failure, and the independent variables are as follows: Strategic (and similarly Cornerstone) is measured as (i) a binary variable, (ii) the average lock-up period of these investors in the IPO, (iii) the number of these investors involved in the IPO, (iv) the ratio of foreign to local strategic (or cornerstone) investors and (v) the proportion of shares in the IPO allocated to these investor. Demand multiple is the oversubscription rate for shares at the time of the IPO; Insider ownership is the percentage of insider ownership at the time of the IPO; Family control is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO firm is family controlled and zero otherwise;
Instit. Allocation is the proportion of shares in the IPO allocated to institutional investors; Age is the number of years from establishment until the IPO; Size is market capitalization at the IPO price; Initial return is the difference between the first-day closing and offer price as a percentage of the offer price; Proceeds is IPO proceeds in million Hong Kong dollars. Pre-IPO net profits is the operating income in the year before the year of the IPO; Pre-IPO sales is sales before the year of the IPO; H-share is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the IPO firm is incorporated in mainland China but listed in Hong Kong and zero otherwise; Reputable underwriter is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an IPO is underwritten by reputable underwriters as measured by the number of IPOs and proceeds, and zero otherwise. 4 We control for industry and year fixed effects.
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As the AFT is a parametric model, it is necessary to specify the distribution of the baseline survival function. We use the likelihood ratio or Wald tests to determine the appropriate distribution in the case of nested models, such as comparing the Weibull against the exponential distribution, or the gamma against the Weibull or lognormal distribution. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is the appropriate test for choosing the best-fitting model in the case of non-nested models, such as between the log-logistic and the lognormal distributions. The AIC is defined as
where L is the maximized value of the likelihood function, k is the number of model covariates and c is the number of model-specific distributional parameters. Both the lognormal and log-logistic models have two distributional parameters (c = 2). The AIC test
shows that the lognormal distribution has a lower AIC value than the log-logistic model, and hence we select the lognormal distribution.
In the AFT model, the exponential of the coefficient is an 'acceleration factor' also known as the time ratio: The effect of an independent variable (covariate) is to extend or shrink the length of survival by a constant relative amount equal to the time ratio. If the time ratio is greater than one, an increase in the covariate increases survival time; while with a time ratio below one, an increase in the covariate decreases survival time (Bradburn et al. 2003) . By comparison, in the Cox Model, the acceleration factor is the hazard ratio. If the hazard ratio is above one, then an increase in the covariate increases the failure rate (note here the dependent variable is failure risk, not the survival time), while a hazard ratio of less than one suggests that an increase in the covariate decreases the failure rate. Table I shows 
Results

[TABLE I HERE]
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In Table II , we first examine the prevalence of backing of IPOs by either cornerstone or strategic investors. 6 We observe a substantial presence of strategic and cornerstone investors Finally, we examine the influence of foreign investors among the two investor types. As reported above, there is an average number of 4 strategic and 3 cornerstone investors per IPO, and of these we find that about 1 in 3 investors is foreign while the remaining 2 are locallybased investors. The difference between strategic and cornerstone investors in terms of the ratio of foreign-to-local investors is minor, although the difference in medians is statistically 13 significant at 10 percent. In conclusion, there is some evidence that foreign investors play a slightly greater role among strategic investors than among cornerstone investors.
Next, we examine underwriter reputation. There is some evidence that reputable underwriter are associated with less risky IPOs (Carter and Manaster 1990) . Following Carter and
Manaster, underwriter reputation is typically measured using tombstone rankings in U.S.
studies. As no comparable tombstones are available in Hong Kong, we measure reputation by market share: reputable underwriters are those in the top quartile in terms of both numbers and proceeds of IPOs they bring to the market during the three years prior to the IPO year.
We find that reputable underwriters are involved in one quarter of strategic- 
[TABLE III HERE]
Our univariate analysis so far suggests an association between the involvement of strategic and cornerstone investors in IPOs and post-IPO survival. Next, we conduct a multivariate analysis to examine the impact of strategic and cornerstone investors on IPO survival after controlling for a range of company and IPO characteristics and other known determinants of IPO survival. First, we estimate an AFT model that controls for company and issue characteristics including the age of the IPO firm, size as measured by market capitalization, pre-IPO net profits, pre-IPO sales, insider ownership, IPO initial returns, proceeds, institutional share allocation, and the level of oversubscription of the IPO (known as the demand multiple). In this AFT model we treat observations that are delisted due to an M&A as censored survivors. As the baseline distribution of the model, we choose the log-normal distribution based on the AIC (as outlined in the methodology section above).
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In Model I, we measure strategic and cornerstone backing using a binary indicator and find that backing by strategic investors significantly increases the time to delisting. The impact of strategic investors is both economically and statistically significant. The exponential of the statistically significant positive strategic-investor coefficient (0.382) is the time ratio (1.466).
This time ratio suggests that the presence of a strategic investor increases survival times by 46.6 percent (i.e., a one-unit increase in the strategic-investor variable increases survival times by a multiple of 1.466). IPO backing by cornerstone investors, by contrast, plays no significant role (given its statistically insignificant coefficient). We also find that share allocations to institutional investors are statistically significant, but only at 10 percent conventional level. This raises the question of why up-front involvement by strategic investors has a significant impact on IPO survival, while cornerstone backing and allocations to institutional investors pursuant to the wider IPO allocation do not.
To address this question we need to understand the underlying factors that drive the impact of strategic investors on IPO survival. One important aspect is likely to be the lock-up agreements entered into by strategic and cornerstone investors. We estimate a series of survival models that (instead of binary indicators) use four continuous measures of the involvement, and commitment, of strategic and cornerstone investors. First, in Model II, we examine the impact of lock-up agreements. In principle, investors with (longer) lock-up agreements will have a greater incentive to ensure a company stays listed at least until the end of the lock-up period. Thus, we expect that strategic investors (with an average 12-month lock-up period) will be associated with longer survival times than cornerstone investors (with an average 6-month lock-up period). Compared to strategic and cornerstone investors, we expect a weaker or no effect on IPO survival of institutional investors that are allocated shares in the IPO without a lock-up period.
Next, in Model III, we measure investor impact using the number of investors of either type backing a given IPO. We expect that more investors of a given type will increase their impact on the IPO firm, including on the firm's propensity to delist. Model IV examines the role of The results of Model II, shown in Table IV , show that the length of strategic investors' lockup periods significantly increases the time to delisting. This is consistent with our expectation that greater investor commitment post-IPO through longer lockup periods leads to longer survival times. By contrast, the lock-up periods of the less committed cornerstone investors do not significantly impact survival times.
In Model III, we find that larger numbers of strategic investors have a statistically significant, positive impact on survival times: More strategic investors in an IPO result in the stock remaining listed longer. By contrast, the effect of cornerstone investors is insignificant, that is, the number of cornerstone investors backing an issue does not matter to IPO survival.
Focusing on the ratio of foreign to local investors in Model III, we find that the presence of more foreign strategic investors does in fact significantly delay delisting. Rather than being more remote and less committed, this result suggests greater commitment, or greater credibility of commitment, by foreign as compared to local investors. For cornerstone investors, by contrast, the impact of the ratio of foreign to local investors on survival times is statistically insignificant.
Model V shows that the proportions of shares allocated to strategic or cornerstone investors at IPOs have no statistically significant impact on survival times. We also examine the impact of the dollar amounts invested by strategic and cornerstone investors in a given IPO, and find qualitatively similar, insignificant results (not reported). This suggests that it is not the amount invested nor the percentage stake taken up by strategic investors, but purely their contractual commitments at and after the IPO, that drive their impact on IPO survival.
Finally, we examine whether anchor investors' commitments are more credible if these commitments are certified by reputable underwriters. Specifically, anchor investors' post-IPO commitments revolve around the lockup agreements they entered into with IPO underwriters.
Post-IPO, underwriters may allow locked up investors to sell shares prior to the end of their lockup periods. In the U.S., such early release from lockup periods is becoming increasingly common in IPOs and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Hence, we expect that anchor investors' lockup agreements are more credible if they are entered into with underwriters that have more reputation capital at stake.
Models VI and VII in Table IV include interaction terms between anchor-investor variables and underwriter reputation to test whether underwriter reputation increases the committed anchor-investor effect on IPO survival times. In this case, we expect a positive coefficient on the interaction term. Consistent with this expectation, in Model VI, we find statistically significant, positive coefficients of the binary indicators of both strategic-and cornerstoneinvestor backing. In fact, we find that the direct effect of strategic-investor backing is 28.2 percent increase of survival time (given the time ratio of 1.282), while the indirect interaction effect of strategic-investor backing with reputable underwriter certification is 1.5 times the direct effect. IPOs backed by strategic investors whose commitment is certified by reputable underwriters have 42 percent longer survival times than strategic-backed IPOs without underwriter certification. The direct effect of cornerstone investors remains insignificant as in the previous analyses, but cornerstone-backing that is certified by reputable underwriters (who are involved in just 11 percent of cornerstone-backed IPOs as shown in Table II above) does significantly increase survival times by 10 percent (time ratio 1.099).
Focusing on underwriter certification of anchor investors' lockup agreements in Model VII, we find statistically significant positive coefficients on the interaction terms of underwriter reputation and lockup length for both strategic and cornerstone investors. We conclude that underwriter certification renders investor commitments more credible for both strategic 
Robustness of the results
We examine the robustness of our results in several ways. First, we treat delistings due to M&As as censored survivors rather than as "failures" (as in Table IV Table V , corresponding to Table IV , are qualitatively unchanged. We find that strategic investors have a significant positive impact on survival times (at the 1 percent level of significance) irrespective of whether their influence is measured as a binary indicator, the number of such investors, the ratio of foreign to local strategic investors, or the lock-up periods of strategic investors.
[TABLE V HERE]
As a further robustness check and for comparison with other studies, we also estimate the Cox proportional hazard model, applied, for example, by Carpentier and Suret (2011) . Unlike the AFT model, the Cox model makes no assumption about the distribution of the baseline parameter. The dependent variable in the Cox model measures the risk of delisting (failure) as opposed to the survival time that is measured in the AFT model. In the Cox model, the marginal effect of an independent variable is measured by the so-called hazard ratio, calculated as the exponential of the coefficient from the Cox model (see, e.g., and Klein 1996). A positive coefficient implies a hazard ratio greater than one, suggesting that an increase in the covariate increases the failure rate. Similarly, a negative coefficient implies a hazard ratio of less than one, indicating that an increase in the covariate reduces the failure rate. The corresponding measure of the marginal effect in the AFT model is the so-called "time ratio". The time ratio is calculated as the exponential of the AFT coefficient (Bradburn et al. 2003) . As a consequence, we expect that a given independent variable with a positive sign (and a time ratio above one) in the AFT model will have a negative coefficient (and a hazard ratio of less than one) in the Cox model. Bearing in mind this difference in the signs of 20 the coefficients, the results reported in Table VI are qualitatively the same as those reported for the AFT models in Tables IV and V above.
[TABLE VI HERE]
In Table VII , we control for endogeneity and selection effects. Our results for strategic investors above may be due to strategic investors' selection of companies that are likely to survive longer, or due to omitted variables determining both strategic investor backing and survival. To disentangle selection and treatment effects, we use a propensity score model to underwriters that they have a (comparatively small) significant impact on survival times.
Controlling for selection effects, we find that our results are driven by treatment effects, that is, by the value that strategic investors add to IPO companies by strategic investors through their monitoring, expertise and access to networks.
In sum, our results indicate that the presence of committed anchor investors at and after the IPO, and the strength of their commitment are significant determinants of IPO survival. Our results are important for issuers, investors and practitioners, and to stock markets and policy makers promoting the involvement of anchor investors. The success of policy initiatives such as the U.S. JOBS Act, that promote anchor investors to facilitate IPOs, may achieve their aim of ensuring companies' longer-term access to external finance by ensuring or increasing anchor investors' commitment.
Our paper highlights not only the significance of anchor investors' commitment, but also the need for disclosure of anchor investors' involvement in IPOs. Our results show that knowledge of anchor-investor involvement, along with data on IPO share allocation, allows investors to identify IPOs that are more likely to remain listed for longer. This finding raises serious concerns over the lack of disclosure of allocation data in most IPO markets. The table shows descriptive statistics for the two subsamples of IPOs backed by either cornerstone or strategic investors. The presence of cornerstone investors (and similarly of strategic investors) is measured as (i) the proportion of shares in the IPO allocated to these investors, (ii) the number of these investors involved in the IPO, (iii) the ratio of foreign to local cornerstone (or strategic) investors, and (iv) the average lock-up period of these investors in the IPO. Instit. Allocation is the proportion of shares in the IPO allocated to institutional shareholders. Demand multiple is the oversubscription rate for shares at the time of the IPO. Insider ownership is the percentage of insider ownership at the time of the IPO. Family control is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO firm is family controlled and zero otherwise. Age is the number of years from establishment until the IPO. Initial return is the difference between the first-day closing and offer price as a percentage of the offer price. Size is market capitalization at the IPO price (in million Hong Kong dollars). Proceeds is IPO proceeds in million Hong Kong dollars. Pre-IPO sales is sales before the year of the IPO. Pre-IPO net profits is the operating income in the year before the year of the IPO. H-share is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the IPO firm is incorporated in the Chinese mainland but listed in Hong Kong and zero otherwise. Reputable underwriter is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an IPO is underwritten by reputable underwriters as measured by the number of IPOs and proceeds, and zero otherwise. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 2002  12  100  99  97  8  100  95  91  28  100  95  92   2003  8  100  100  98  9  100  98  96  20  100  96  93   2004  7  100  96  94  19  100  97  93  5  100  96  92   2005  21  100  100  99  16  100  100  98  15  100  98  96   2006  24  100  97  95  20  100  95  88  8  100  97  94   2007  31  100  97  93  29  100  95  90  17  100  97  88   2008  9  100  93  89  5  100  93  82  13  100  66 Proceeds is IPO proceeds in million Hong Kong dollars. Pre-IPO net profits is the operating income in the year before the year of the IPO. Pre-IPO sales is sales before the year of the IPO. H-share is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the IPO firm is incorporated in mainland China but listed in Hong Kong and zero otherwise. Reputable underwriter is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an IPO is underwritten by reputable underwriters as measured by the number of IPOs and proceeds, and zero otherwise. We control for year and industry in the regressions. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. IPO prospectus.
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